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OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01 SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15

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R 231550Z MAY 75
FM USMISSION NATO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1999
SECDEF WASHDC
INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS 5310
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY MADRID
USDEL MBFR VIENNA
USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR
USLOSACLANT
CINCLANT
:CINCUSAREUR
CINCUSNAVEUR
CINCUSAFE

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 5 USNATO 2913

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MPOL,NATO, DPC
SUBJECT: DPC MINISTERIAL MEETING MAY 22, 1975; AGENDA ITEM III,
INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING

GENEVA FOR CSCE DEL

SUMMARY: MGEN FOURNAIS, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR INTELLIGENCE,
IMS, BRIEFED MINISTERS ON THE LATEST NATO EXTIMATE OF WARSAW
PACT STRENTTH AND CAPABILITIES.HIS BRIEFING, TRANSMITTED
BELOW, PROVIDE HIGHLIGHTS OF MC 161/75, IN PARTIUCLAR THE
TREATMENT OF WARNING OF WAR AND THE STATUS OF SOVIET DEVELOP-.
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MENTS IN THE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, ANDSCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL
FIELDS. HE REVIEWED THE STATUS OF SOVVIET MISSILE DEVELOPMENT AND
OF GROUND, NAVAL, AND AIR FORCES. HE STATED THAT THE PACT
IS DEVOTING GREATER ATTENTION TO CONVENTIONAL WARFARE AN AREA IN

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WHICH THE SOVIETS HAVE EXCELLENT EQUIPMENT,PARTTICULARLY
IN ARMOR, ARTILLERY, AIR DEFENSE, AND LOGISTIC TRANSPORT.
MGEN FOURNAIS SUMMARIZED THE MAJOR STRENGTHS AND WEAKENSSES
OF THE WARSAW PACT AND, REFERRING TO MC 255, NOTED CONTINUED
PACT EFFORT TO EXTEND INFLUENCE INTO AREAS OF THE MIDDLE EAST,
NORTH AFRICA, AND ADJACENT SEA AREAS. HE SUMMARIZED HIS
BRIEFING BY STATING THAT "THE SOVIET UNION IS STILL COMMITTED
TO BECOMING THE DOMINANT POWER IN THE WORKD AND MILITARY
STRENGTH IS THE KEY ELEMENT OF THEIR POLICY". HE CONCLUDED
BY POINTING TO WARSAW PACT IMPORVEMENTS AND THE TREND IN SOME
NATO COUNTRIES AND REDUCING MILITARY FORCES AND DEFENSE
EXPENDITURES WHICH "LEADS ONE TO THE CNCLUSION THAT THE
BALANCE CONTINUES TO CHANGE IN FAVOUR OF THE WARSAW PACT."
MINISTERIAL DISCUSSION WAS WIDE-RANGING, TOUCHING ON A
VARIETY OF SUBJECTS INCLUDING: THE NEED TO PROVIDE PUBLICS
A BETTER APPRECIATION OF THE THREAT; THE NATURE OF POLITICAL
DIFFICULTIES FACING MOD'S; THE NEED FOR A "NET" ASSESSMENT
SHOWING NATO'S STRENGTH AND WEAKNESS AS WELL AS THOSE OF THE
PACT; THE IMPROVED NATO TREATMENT OF WARNING TIME WHICH NOW
FOCUSES ON PACT PREPARATIONS VICE DUECISIONS; THE EFFECT ON
NATO STRATEGY OF A CHANGING NAVAL BALANCE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN;
AND A CONTROVERSIAL REFERENCE TO SOUTH AFRICA. END SUMMARY.

1. FOLLOWING MGEN FOURNAIS'S BRIEFING, RICHARDSON (CANADA)
LET OFF DISCUSSION BY STATING THAT WE MUST PERSUADEOUR PEOPLE AND,
TO THIS END, THEY SHOULD HEAR WHAT MINISTERS HAVE JUST HEARD.
RICHARDSON NOTED THAT HE NEEDS TO CONVINCE HIS COLLEAGUES AND
COUNTRYMEN OF THE THREAT,SO MINISTERS SHOULD ALL STATE THE
SITUATION MORE PUBLICLY. AFTER A BRIEF INTERCHANGE ON THIS
QUESTION BETWEEN SYG LUNS AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE MILITARY
COMMITTEE, MGEN FOURNAIS ANNOUNCED THAT AN UNCLASSIFIED VER-
SIONOF HIS BRIEFING WOULD BO TO THE PRESS AT NOON TODAY.

2. VANDEN BOEYNANTS (BELGIUM) EXPRESSED HIS VIEW THAT SECRETARY
SCHLESINGER'S DIFFICULTIES ARE REALLY POLITICAL INNATURE. WHEN
HEADS OF GOVERNMENT AND FOREGIN MINISTERS MEET AND MAKE CERTAIN
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AGREEMENTS, DEFENSE MINISTERS FIND THEMSELVES "ACED".
AS LONG AS THIS GOES ON, SPLITS WILL ARISE WITHIN
GOVERNMENTS. THENEXT SPLIT THAT CAN ARISE IS THAT BETWEEN
THE PEOPLE AND THE RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AT THE
POLICY LEVEL. IN THIS REGARD, VANDEN BOEYNANTS RMARKED
THAT THE PUBLIC HEARS CONTRADICTIONS. FOR EXAMPLE, HE HAD A
COPY OF THEPAPER "NOUVELLES ATLANTIQUES" WITH WHAT HE CALLED
AN INCREDIBLE STORY ABOUT WHAT THE US DEFENSE MINISTER HAD SAID
ABOUT THE NILITARY BALANDE. BRANCHING OUT, VANDEN BOEYNAMTS STATED
EUROPEAN MOD'S ARE SPEAKING TO THE "OLD FOGIES" WHO ARE ALL OVER
THE ALLIANCE AND WHO DATE BACK TO WW II. THE YOUNG,HOWEVER, ARE NOT
LISTENING AND THEMOD'S ARE ALONE IN BEING CONCERNED. MAKING A LAST
POINT ON LENGTH OF CONSCRIPT SERVICE, VANDEN BOEYNANTS NOTED
THAT MINISTERS CAN SAY ALL THEY WISH TO MOD'S BUT IT DOESN'T

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SELL GOVERNMENTS. THE ALTERNATIVE IS MORE REGULARS,I.E.,
"PROFESSIONALIZATIO". THERE IS NOT ONE HEAD OF GOVERNMENT
WHO COULD SWING AN INCREASE OF SIX MONTHS CONSCRIPT SERVICE
WITH HIS PARLIAMENT.

3.LEBER(FRG) NOTED THAT SECRETARY SCHLESINGER GOT HIS
BUDGET THROUGH CONGRESS WITHOUT MAJOR CUTS; ALSO SOME CRITICS
IN CONGRESS SUCH AS SENATOR MANSFIELD HAVE BEGUN "LAYING OFF".
BUT, HE ASKED, WHATABOUT THE EUROPEANS? SECRETARY SCHLESINGER
IS RIGHT IN SAYING EUROPEANS MUST MAKE EFFORTS ESPECIALLY IN
THE LIGHT OF HIS SUCCESS WITH CONGRESS AND THE CONTINUANCE OF
THE US COMMITMENT. LEBER STATED THAT EUROPE'S UNCERTAINITES
LIE IN THE CONVENTIONAL EFFORT AND MOD'S MUST TELL PARLIAMENTS
ABOUT THE THREAT. REFERRING TO THE INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING,
LEBER DIDN'T SEE MUCH ABOUT DEVELOMENTS DURING THE LAST
TWELVE MONTHS ALTHOUGH ITS TONE WAS PESSIMISTIC AS USUAL.
HOWEVER, MINISTERS WERE NOT BRIEFED ONHOW MUCH WEAKER NATO
HAS BECOME VIS-A-VIS THE PACT. LEBER WONDERED WHERE THE
IMBALANCES WERE, AS WOULD BE FOUND IN A BUSINESS'S
ACCOUNTING.

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NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01 SAJ-01

SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 NSC-05 ACDA-05

BIB-01 EB-07 OES-03 COME-00 AF-06 EA-06 NEA-10 /115 W
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R 231550Z MAY 75
FM USMISSION NATO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2000
SECDEF WASHDC
INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS 5311
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY MADRID
USDEL MBFR VIENNA
USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR
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4. VREDELING (THE NETHERLANDS) SAID HIS TROUBLE WAS WITH
HIS FINANCE MINISTER AND THOUGHT IT A GOOD IDEA IF BOTH
FINANCE AND FOREIGN MINISTERS COULD BE PRESENT AT DISUCSSIONS
LIKE THIS. CONCERNING NATO'S CAPABILITY,VREDELING DOESN'T
BELIEVE IT GETS WEAKER AND WEAKER EXPECIALLY CONSIDERING NATO'S
INVESTMENT PROGRAMS COMPARED TO THOSE OF THE WARSAW PACT;
THESE PROGRAMS PRODUCE GOOD EQUIPMENT LIKE THE F-16. WITH
THIS INMIND, VREDELING STATED HE DOES NOT PLAN TO GIVE
INFORMATION SUCH AS HE HEARD TODAY TO THE PUBLIC. PICKING
UP LEBER'S POINT, VREDELING SAID HE WOULD NEED A COMPARATIVE
ASSESSMENT OF NATO. IN THIS REGARD,HE CHARACTERIZED
SECRETARY SCHLESINGER'S VIEW THAT WE ARE "NOT AS BAD AS WE
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THINK" AS SELF-DEFEATING.

5. THE CHAIRMAN OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE,ADMIRAL OF THE
FLEET SIR PETER HILL-NORTON TOOK ISSUE WITH VREDELING'S
ASSERTION THAT NATO LOOKS AT ONLY ONE SIDE OF THE COIN. HE
REFERRED TO ANOTHER DOCUMENT ON THE MILITARY APPRECIATION
WHICH IS IN EFFECT A BALANCE SHEET. SYG LUNS JUOINED SIR
PETER IN THIS VIEW.

6. MASON(UK) REFERRED TO HIS HARD-WON EXPERIENCE GAINED
FROM THE UK DEFENSE REVIEW AND AGREED THAT MOD'S MUST GET
THIS KIND OF INFORMATION DECLASSIFIED SO THEY CAN USE IT.
YOUNG PEOPLE'S ATTITUDES ARE MORE TOLERANT TOWARDS ISSUES
SUCH AS COMMUNISM AND, THEREFORE, PROTECTING INTELLIGENCE
WHILE DEFENSE DECLINES IS "STUPID."

7. FOSTERVOLL(NORWAY)REMARKED THAT MOD'S HAVE SPOKEN FOR
TWENTY-FIVE YEARS AND THIS HAS BECOME FRUSTRATING. THE
COURAGE TO FIGHT IN GOVERNMENTS AND PARLIAMENTS MUST BE
BASED ON THE WORTHINESS OF DOING MORE IN DEFENSE AND NOT ON
JUST A STARK THREAT DESCIPTION. HE NOTED THAT EUROPE IS
NOT DOING ALL THAT BADLY IN BAD ECONOMIC TIMES. FINALLY,
FOSTERVOLL STATED THAT NORWEGIAN SOLDIERS SERVING ONLY
TWLEVE TO FIFTEEN MONTHS ARE NOT A FLOP, AS THE CHAIRMAN OF
THE MILITARY COMMITTEE CONTENDED (DURING AGENDA ITEM II).
TO TELL NORWEGIAN SOLDIERS DIFFERENTLY WOULD BE TO SUFFER A
PSYCHOLIGICAL LOSS. IN LOOKING BACK TO THE DAYS WHEN THE US
NUCLEAR MONOPOLY WAS EUROPE'S ONLY HOPE, LUNS REMARKED THAT NATO
HAS COME A LONG WAY.

8. SECRETARY SCHELESINGER EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE NEW
HANDLING OF WARNING OF WAR.PAST EMPHASIS RELIED ON KNOW-
LEDGE OF POLITBURO INTENTIONS TO ATTACK.NOW WE CAN
MONITOR EFFECTIVELY CHANGES INPREPARATIONSTO ATTACK, AND
MUST RESPOND TO THESE INDICATIONS OF PREPARATIONS INSTEAD OF
INTENT TO ATTACK. EIGHTEEN MONTHS AGO SECRETAY SCHLESNGER
NOTED THE MILITARY STRESS ON SUDDEN ATTACK WAS BECAUSE THEY

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FELT THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP WOULD NOT RESPOND. NOW E MUST
RESPOND TO INDICATORS AND THIS PRESENTS A CHALLENGE TO
POLITICAL WILL; TO THE EXTENT OUR POLITICAL LEADERSHIP CAN
RESPOND, WE ARE FINE.ON THIS SUBJECT SECRETARY SCHLESINGER
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AGAIN COMMENDED THE MILITARY COMMITTEE.

9. AT THIS POINT,VADM JUNGIUS, REPRESENTING SACLANT, PROVIDED
A BRIEFING ON THE WORLDWIDE SOVIET NAVAL EXERCISE OKEAN 75.
LEBER TOOK THIS OPPORTUNITY TO SUGGEST THAT NATO CONCEPTS
MAY BE SUBJECT TO CHANGE. HE GAVE THE EXAMPLE OF THEUS
SIXTH FLEET WHICH WAS ESTABLISHED TO SUPPORT FORCES ASHORE.
HOWEVER THE GROWTH OF THE SOVIET MEDITERRANEAN SQUADRON,
WHICH CAN EQUAL THE SXTH FLEET, HAS PRESENTED A NEW SITUA-
TION GOING BEYOND MERE QUANTITATIVE CHANGE. LEBER ALSO
EXPRESSED CONCERN AT THE WORLDWIDE COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITY
DEMONSTRATED BY SOVIET MARITIME FORCES.FINALLY, LEBER
WONDERED ABOUT SOUTH AFRICA'S STRATEGIC PLANS IN THE LIGHT OF SOVIET
ADVANCES.

10. CONCERNING THE SOVIET MEDITERRANEAN SQUADRON, THE CHAIR-
MAN OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE STATED THIS FORCE HAS BEEN
STABLE AT ABOUT FIFTY UNITS FOR THE PAST TWO YEARS. HE
CHARACTERIZED THE MEDITERRANEAN MARITIME SITUATION AS STILL
BEING SATISFACTORY. IN THIS REGARD THE SOVIET AIRCRAFT
CARRIERS WILL NOT BE IN THE SAME LEAGUE AS US CARRIERS AND
THE NEXT FOUR TO FIVE YEARS SHOULD SEE NO REQUIRMENT FOR A
NEW NATO STRATEGY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. LUNS REMARKED THAT
FRANCE WAS SHIFTING THE BULK OF ITS NAVY FROM THE ATLANTIC
TO THE MEDITERRANEAN AND ALSO CITED ITALY'S PLANNED
EXPENDITURE OF 100 BILLION LIRE EACH YEAR ON ITS NAVY.

1. VREDELING, REFERRING TO LEBER'S SOUTH AFRICA COMMENT,
EXPRESSED CONSTERNATION AND STRONGLY STATED HIS CONTRY'S
OPPOSITION TO ANY CONSIDERATION OF SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENCES
POLICIES.

12. TEXT OF BRIEFING FOLLOWS:
BEGIN TEXT:

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R 231550Z MAY 75
FM USMISSION NATO
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SECDEF WASHDC
INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS 5312
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY MADRID
USDEL MBFR VIENNA
USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR
USLOSACLANT
CINCLANT
:CINCUSAREUR
CINCUSNAVEUR
CINCUSAFE

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REPORT TO
THE DEFENCE PLANNING COMMITTEE IN MINISTERIAL SESSION
ON THE RESULTS OF THE 1975 INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE
22 MAY 1975

MR. CHAIRMAN, GENTLEMEN,

THIS BRIEFING IS TO ADVISE YOU OF THE LATEST ESTIMATE
OF WARSAW PACT STRENGTH AND CAPABILITIES AND OF WARSAW PACT
PENETRATION INTO AREAS BORDERING NATO.

USERS OF THE EARLIER EDITIONS OF MC161 HAVE HAD SOME DIFFICULTY
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INTERPRETING THE TERMINOLOGY APPLICABLE TO THE WARNING OF WAR
PROCESS. THE NEW ESTIMATE, IN ADDITION TO BEING MORE
DESCRIPTIVE, ALSO INCLUDES THE DEFINITIONS OF THE TWO DEY TERMS,.
"WARNING" AND WARNING TIME". THE FIRST OF THESE TERMS,
"WARNING", IS DEFINED AS ANY NOTIFICATION BY NATO INTELLIGENCE,
BASED ON THE SUM OF THE AVAILABLE INDICATIONS, THAT WARLIKE
PREPARATIONS ARE IN PROGRESS. THIS SECOND TERM, "WARNING TIME",
IS DEFNINED AS THE PERIOD BETWEEN THE INITIAL "WARNING" AND THE
OUTBREAK OF WAR OR CANCELLATION OF "WARNING".

MISINTERPRETATION OF THESE TERMS IN REGARD TO JUST
WHAT IT IS THAT INTELLIGENCE CAN DETECT, AS WELL AS A LACK
OF UNDERSTANDING OF THE INTERACTION OF POLITICAL AND MILITARY
INDICATIONS HAS LED SOME PEOPLE TO BELIEVE THAT INTELLIGENCE
COULD PROVIDE AN INDICATION OF THE NEMY INTNETION TO GO

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TO WAR. HOPEFULLY, THIS MISCONCEPTION IS REMOVED IN THENEW
ESTIMATE BY THE SUBSTITUTION OF THE TERMINILOGY THAT WARLIKE
PREPARATIONS HAVE BEEN DETECTED.

AS A RESULT, THE PREVIOUS REFERENCES TO DIFFERING
SCENARIOS HAVE BEEN DELETED FROM THE ESTIMATE. THE NATO
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY BELIEVES THAT INDICATIONS RESULTING
FROM THE INCREASED LEVEL OF READINESS, WHICH THE WARSAW PACT
WOULD HAVE TO TAKE AS A CONTINGENCY IN CASE OF ESCALATION,
WOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO PROVIDE SOMEWHERE IN NATO A BRIEF
WARNING OF IMPENDING ATTACK.

MOVING ON NOW TO OTHER PORTIONS OF THE ESTIMATE, THE
POLITICAL SECTION MAKES THE POINT THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS
STILL COMMITTED TO BECOMING THE DOMINANT POWER IN THE WORLKD,
AND THAT MILITARY STRENGTH IS THE DEY ELEMENT OF THEIR
POLICY.

THE SOVIET UNION HAS THE SECOND STRONGEST NATIONAL
ECONOMY. IT IS STILL IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE,
EXCEPT BY ESTIMATION, THE AMOUNT OF SOVIET EXPENDITURES ON
DEFNECE. THE BEST ESTIMATES SHOW THAT DEFENCE SPENDING HAS
GROWN MORE RAPIDLY THAN ANTICIPATED LAST YEAR. THE
CONTINUING INCREASE IN EXPEDDITURE WILL RESULT IN AN AMOUNT
OF BETWEEN 30 AND 34 MILLIARD RUBLES IN 1975 AND IS ABOUT
8 PERCENT OF THE WESTERN ASSESSMENT OF SOVIET GROSS NATIONAL
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PRODUCT.

IN THE SCIENFIFIC AND TECHNICAL FIELD, THE SOVIETS
HAVE MADE SIGNIFICANT STRIDES IN THE DEVLOPMENT AND
PRODUCTION OF SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS SYSTEMS. NOTEABLE AMONG
THERE ARE :

- A NEW SHORT-RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEM,
WHICH IS BEING DEVELOPED FOR THE GROUND FORCES AS A FOLLOW-UP
TO THE EXISTING SCUD.

-DEVELOPMENT IS IN PROGRESS OF SO-CALLED "SMART" OR
CONTROLLABLE WEAPONS USING TELEVISIO, OPTICS OR LASERS FOR
GUIDANCE.

THE MOST SIGNIFICANT TECHNOLOGICAL ACHIEVEMENT UNDER
DEVELOPMENT IS THE RADAR OEEAN RECONNAISSANCE SATELLITE.
THIS RECONNAISSANCE VEHICLE MAY HAVE THE CAPABILITY OF
DETECTING UNITS AT SEA WITH PRECISION. WHEN OPERATIONAL
IT WILL PERMIT WARSSAW PACT NAVAL MISSILE FIRING FORCES TO
LOCATE TARGETS WITHOUT THE SERVICES OF OPTICAL OR RADAR
TARGET ACQUISITION PLATFORMS. WE HAVE NO FIRM KNOWLEDGE
OF ITS DISCRIMINATION OR REAL-TIME DOWNLINK CAPABILITIES.
IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SUCH SATELLITES COULD ALSO BE USED FOR

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NAVIGATION, COMMUNICATION, AND ELECTRONIC COUNTER MEASURES.

THE SOVIETS ARE TESTING FOUR NEW INTER-CONTINENTAL
BALLISTC MISSILES AND ALL OF THEM HAVE A DESIGNATION OF
SS-X FOR EXPERIMENTAL SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILES, SO TO
SOUND LESS COMPLICATED, I SHALL REFER ONLY TO THE NUMBERS.
THE NEW ONES ARE THE 16, A SMALL SOLID-PROPELLANT MISSILE
AND THE 17, 18 AND 19, ARE LARGE LIQUID-PROPELLANT MISSILES.
THE 16 AND 18 HAVE SINGLE RE-ENTRY VEHICLE CAPABILITY; THE
17, ONE VERSION OF THE 18 AND THE 19 HAVE A MULTIPLE
INDEPENDENTLY TRAGETABLE RE-ENTRY VEHICLE (MIRV) CAPABILITY.

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SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 NSC-05 ACDA-05

BIB-01 EB-07 OES-03 COME-00 AF-06 EA-06 NEA-10 /115 W
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R 231550Z MAY 75
FM USMISSION NATO
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SECDEF WASHDC
INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS 5313
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY MADRID
USDEL MBFR VIENNA
USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR
USLOSACLANT
CINCLANT
:CINCUSAREUR
CINCUSNAVEUR
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SDOGT EXISTING SOVIET ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEM,
GALOSH, PROVIDES ONLY A LIMITED DEFENCE FOR THE MOSCOW AREA
AND APPEARS TO HAVE LITTLE ABILITY TO HANDLE SOPHISTICATED
THREATS, THE SOVIETS WILL PROBABLY REPLACE IT UPON
COMPLETION F CURRENT RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING OF
NEW ANTI-BALLASTIC MISSILE COMPONENTS. THIS IS WITHIN THE
TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT ON STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATIONS. WHEN AN
OPERATIONAL OVER-THE-HORIZON DETECTION RADAR IS COMPLETED,

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WHICH IS EXPRECTED IN THE NEXT TWO YEARS, THE SOVIETS WILL
HAVE IMPROVIED BALLISTIC MISSILE EARLY WARNING.

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THE ASSESSED TOTAL STRENGTH OF SOVIET GROUND FORCES IS
NEARLY 2.6 MILLION MEN IN 166 DIVISIONS AND THE RELATED
ARMY AND FRON COMBAT AND LOGISTIC SUPPORTS UNITS. THE GROUND
FORCES OF THE NON-SOVIET WARSAW PACT CONTRIES ARE ASSESSED
AS 791,000 MEN IN 60 DIVISIONS AND 5 BRIGADES. THIS IS AN
OVERALL INCREASED OF ABOUT 360,000 MEN IN THE SOVIET GROUND
FORCES AND OF NEARLY 30,000 MEN IN THE NON-SOVIET WARSAW PACT
GROUND FORCES. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THESE INCREASED
PERSONNEL FIGURES ARISE MAINLY FROM A REASSESSMENT OF AVAILABLE
DATA RATHER THAN A HANGE IN ACTUAL STRENGTHS OR ORGANIZATION.

THE WARSAW PACT IS DEVOTING GREATER ATTENTION TO THE
CONDUCT OF CONVENTIONAL WARFARE, WITHOUT REDUCING THE
IMPORTANCE THEY ATTACH TO NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES. THE SOVIETS
PROBABLY BELIEVE THAT THEY HAVE REACHED THE CORRECT BALANCE
BETWEEN NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL FORCES, AND APART FROM THE
POSSIBLE INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR PROJECTILES FOR ARTILLERY,
NO CHANGE IN THIS BALANCE IS EXPECTED.

WE SHOULD MAKE NO MISTAKE, THE SOVIETS HAVE EXCELLENT
EQUIPMENT; THIS IS PARTICULARLY TURE IN THE FIELD OF ARMOUR,
ARTILLERY,AIR DEFENCE AND LOGISTIC TRANSPORT. WITHIN THE
MOTORIZED RIFLE AND TANK DIVISIONS, A REORGANIZATION IS
UNDERWAY LEADING TO GREATER FIREPOWER AND IMPROVED MOBILITY,
(THROUGH THE USE OF MORE SOPHISTICATED EQUPMENT).

THE SOVIETS ATTACH GROWING IMPORTANCE TO THE TACTICAL
EMPLOYMENT OF ARMED HELICOPTERS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF A
HELICOPTER ASSULT CAPABLITY. ALTHOUGH THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION
OF SOVIET HELIBORNE ASSUALT DOCTRINE APPEARS BY NO MEANS
COMPLETE, SOME DIVISIONS ARE APPARENTLY RECEIVING SPECIAL
TRAINING.

IN GENERAL, IT IS ASSESSED THAT SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENTS
IN THE WARSAW PACT GROUND FORCES ARE MORE LIKELY TO BE IN
COMBAT CAPABILITY THAN IN THEIR SIZE OR DISTRIBUTION.

IN THE NAVAL FORCES, SUBSTANTIVE IMPROVEMENTS CONTINUE,
AMONG THEM:

-THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN OPERATIONAL PATROL IN THE
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GREENLAND/BARENTS SEAS, BY DELTA CLASS BALLISTIC MISSILE

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SUBMARINES, OF WHICH THERE ARE NOW 6-8 OPERATIONAL.

- A SUCCESSOR TO THE DELTA IS NOW UNDER CONSTRUCTION AND WILL PROBABLY BE LARGER THAN ITS PREDECESSOR AND WILL CARRY ABOUT 18 MISSILES.

-IMPROVEMENTS IN THE GENERAL PURPOSE SUBMARINES, (MAINLY) BY THE INTRODUCTION OF THE CHARLIE II CLASS NUCLEAR POWERED GUIDED MISSILE SUMBARINE; AND A RESUMPTION OF THE ALFA CLASS NUCLEAR POWERED SUBMARINE CONSTRUCTION HAS BEEN NOTED.

-THE FIRST OF THE KIEV CLASS AIRCRAFT CARRIERS IS NOW EXPECTED TO BE OPERATIONAL BY MID-1976, POSSIBLY EARLIER. A SECOND IS UNDER CONSTRUCTION. THIS CLASS IS EXPECTED TO HAVE ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE AS A PRIMARY ROLE, AND MAY BE CAPABLE OF PERFORMING OTHER MISSIONS.

-THE BACKFIRE BOMBER APPEARS TO HAVE ENTERED SERVICE IN NAVAL AVIATION. IT WAS DEPLOYED IN THE RECENT NAVAL EXERCISE.

THE SOVIETS CONTINUE T DEPLOY THEIR NAVAL FORCES WORLD-WIDE AND THEY STILL EXPEND CONSIDEABLE EFFORT IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THEIR AFLOAT LOGISTIC SUPPORT CAPABILITY.

TURNING NOW TO THE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE AIR FORCES, THE SOVIETS HAVE CONTINUED TO INCREASE AND MODERNIZE THEIR AIRCRAT INVENTORY. EVEN MORE IMPORTANT, THEIR TRAINING METHODS HAVE BEEN IMPROVED AND THEIR USE OF ADVANCED COMMAND AND CONTROL TECHNIQUES AND EMPHAISIS ON OFFENSIVE TACTICS RESULT IN A GREATLY INCREASED AIR THREAT. THE BACKFIRE HAS ALSO BEEN DEPLOYED TO THE LONG-RANGE AVIATION FORCES AND THE CANDID, A NEW AND MORE VERSATILE TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT, HAS BEEN INTRODUCED INTO THE MILITARY TRANPOST AVIATION. THE FENCER FIGHTER BOMBER IS NOW OPERATIONAL WITH FRONTAL AVIATION AND, BY THE END OF 1975, WILL PROBABLY BE EQUIPPED WITH AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES WITH ANTI-RADAR GUIDANCE.

AIR DEFENCE FORCES CONTINUE TO RECEIVE THE NEWEST
SECRET

SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE SYSTEMS AND THE SA-8 HAS BEEN DEPLOYED IN THE LAST YEAR. IT PROVIDES GREATER ELECTRONIC COUNTER-COUNTERMEASURE AND LOWER ALTITUDE CAPABILITIES, BUT STILL DOES NOTKOMPLETELY FILL THE LOW ALTITUDE GAP IN AIR DEFENCES WHICH THE SOVIETS CONTINUE TO COVER WITH FIGHTER AIRCRAFT USING AIR-TO-AIR MISSILES.

CONSIDERING THE WARSAW PACT STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES, THE FOLLOWING MAJOR POINTS EMERGE:

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ASTRATEGICALLY, THE MOST IMPORTANT ADVANTAGES
FAVOURING THE SOVIETS ARE:

-THE MILITARY INITIATIVE;

-GEOGRAPHY: AND
-THE PEACETIME DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES.

- THE MAJOR MILITARY STRENGTH LIES IN THE SIZE AND
EQUIPMENT OF WARSAW PACT ARMED FORCES AND THEIR ABILITY
TO MOBILIZE RAPDILY; CENTERALIZING CONTROL SIMPLIFIES DECISION
MAKING AND RESPONSIVENESS TO COMMAND AND CONTROL, ESPECTIALLY
IN AN EMERGENCY. NEVERTHELESS, HEREIN LIES A POTENTIAL
WEAKNESS IN THAT OVER-CENTRALIZATION CAN LEAD TO A LACK OF
FLEXIBILITY AND INITIATIVE, PARTIUCLARY IN LOWER LEVELS OF
COMMAND, A SITUATION WHICH MAY BE MADE WORSE, IF PLANS GO
WRONG OR IF UNEXPECTED SITUATIONS ARISE.

-EASTERN EUROPE PROVIDES A BUFFER ZONE FOR THE
SOVIETS BUT IT CREATES THE DISADVANTAGES THAT THEIR LINES OF
COMMUNICATION ARE LONG; THEY ARE ALSO RELATIVELY LIMITED,
AS FAR AS STRATEGIC LAND TRANSPORT IS CONCERNED, ESPECIALLY
WITHIN THE USSR.

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 IO-10 ISO-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-02 INR-07 L-02

NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01 SAJ-01

SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 NSC-05 ACDA-05

BIB-01 EB-07 OES-03 COME-00 AF-06 EA-06 NEA-10 /115 W
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AMEMBASSY MADRID
USDEL MBFR VIENNA
USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR
USLOSACLANT
CINCLANT
:CINCUSAREUR
CINCUSNAVEUR

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-ALTHOUGH THE LEADERS OF THE NON-SOVIET WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES ARE DEDICATED COMMUNISTS, AND THE GRIP OF THEIR PARTIES IS STONG IN EVERY FACET OF LIFE, THE SOVIETS PROBABLY HAVE CERTAIN DOUBTS ABOUT THE RELIABILITY OF SOME OF THESE COUNTRIES, AND THEREFORE MUST AKE THIS FACTOR INTO ACCOUNTY WHEN PLANNING.

LASTLY, THE MC 255 SHOWS THAT THERE HAS BEEN A CONTINUED EFFORT ON THE PART OF THE WARSAW PACT TO EXTEND THEIR INFLUENCE INTO THE AREAS OF THE MIDDLE EAST, NORTH AFRICA AND ADJACENT SEA AREAS WITH VARYING DEGREES OF SUCCESS, AND THIS IS EXPECTED TO CONTINUE. ADDITIONALLY, THE RE-OPENING OF THE SUEZ CANAL, WHICH IS EXPECTED SOMETIME
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IN EARLY JUNE 1975, WILL GIVE GREAER FLEXIBILITY TO THE NAVAL FORCES AND PERMIT FAR EASIER ACCESS TO THE COUNTRRIES BORDERING THE RED SEA, THE PERSIAN GULF, THE INDIAN OCEAN, AS WELL AS THE EAST COAST OF AFRICA. ON THE OTHER HAND, IT SHOULD BE REMEMEBERED THAT IT IS COMPARATIVELY EASY TO RE-CLOSE THE CANAL.

TO SUMMARIZE, GENTLEMEN, THE SOVIET UNION IS STILL COMMITTED TO BECOMING THE DOMINANT POWER IN THE WORLD AND MILITARY STRENGTH IS THE KEY ELEMENT OF THEIR POLICY. THERE IS A SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN QUALITY, IN BOTH COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS AND MATERIEL IN ALL THEIR SERVICES. THEY CONTINUE UNABATED IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW AND IMPROVIED STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL MISSILE SYSTEMS.

THIS YEAR'S ESTIMATE AGAIN SHOWS CLEARLY THAT THE MILITARY STRENGTH AND CAPABLITY OF THE WARSAW PACT HAS FURTHER IMPROVED. NEVERTHELESS, IT IS FAIR TO SAY THAT IN A NUMBER OF FIELDS, THEIR IMPROVEMENTS ARE ONLY REDUCING THE LEAD WHICH THE WEST HAS HELD FOR MANY YEARS. FURTHERMORE, TO BE REALISTIC ONE MUST LLOOK AT BOTH SIDES OF THE EQUATION. THE TREND OVER RECENT YEARS OF REDUCING MILITARY FORCES AND DEFENCE EXPENDITUTES IN SOME NATO COUNTRIES LEADS ONE TO THE CNCLUSION THAT THE BALANCE CONTINUES TO CHANGE IN FAVOUR OF THE WARSAW PACT.
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To: STATE
SECDEF INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS
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MADRID
MBFR VIENNA
USNMR SHAPE

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USLOSACLANT
CINCLANT
:CINCUSAREUR
CINCUSNAVEUR
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